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This study focuses on the co-evolution of informal organizational structures and individual 
knowledge transfer behavior within organizations. Our research methodology distinguishes us 
from other similar studies. We use agent-based modeling and dynamic social network analysis, 
which allow for a dynamic perspective and a bottom-up approach. We study the emergent network 
structures and behavioral patterns, as well as their micro-level foundations. We also examine the 
exogenous factors influencing the emergent process. We ran simulation experiments on our model 
and found some interesting findings. For example, it is observed that knowledgeable individuals 
are not well connected in the network, and our model suggests that being fully involved in 
knowledge transfer might undermine individuals’ knowledge advantage over time. Another 
observation is that when there is high knowledge diversity in the system, informal organizational 
structure tends to form a network of good reachability; that is, any two individuals are connected 
via a few intermediates. 
Keywords:  knowledge transfer, network evolution, agent-based modeling, social network analysis 
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Introduction 
Interpersonal knowledge transfer has long been touted as a critical driver of innovation, organizational learning, and 
organizational performance (Davenport et al. 1998). Organizational employees create, recognize, archive, access, 
apply, and integrate knowledge to carry out their tasks. Additionally, they often seek information from each other 
even though other sources of information, such as documents and databases, are available (Cross et al. 2001; Hansen 
et al. 1999). Managers may be able to use the organizational structure as a lever to improve knowledge transfer and 
organizational learning (Argote et al. 2003). In this perspective, knowledge is seen as embedded in various 
organizational structure elements such as individual members and their skills, technical tools, procedures and 
routines, and the networks formed among these elements (Argote et al. 2000); organizations are seen as systems that 
access, harness, and integrate knowledge scattered across different sources (Grant 1996; Kogut et al. 1992; Nonaka 
et al. 1995; Spender 1996; Zander et al. 1995). Some organizational structures that might promote knowledge 
transfer have been identified, such as semi-isolated subgroups (Fang et al. 2010), but their feasibility and 
sustainability regarding individuals’ self-interests have not been discussed. Researchers also find some contingency 
factors to the influence of organizational structure on knowledge transfer, such as the characteristics of knowledge 
(Hansen 1999),  but the organizational structure and the contingent influences are assumed to be static.  
This common assumption that organizational structure is imposed in a top-down fashion and remains static is 
fallible. On the one hand, informal structures are at least as important as formal structures in terms of interpersonal 
knowledge transfer (Orlikowski 2002) and organizational learning (Bailey et al. 2010; Cross et al. 2004).While the 
former is imposed by top management and might remain static for a certain period of time, the latter is more likely 
to emerge from local interactions of individual employees. On the other hand, individuals independently and 
proactively pursue their goals during knowledge transfer. They act to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs. 
They adapt their action strategies to changing conditions. Even if individuals are less purposeful, their actions may 
still have different consequences due to their heterogeneity in, for example, knowledge transfer abilities (Cohen et 
al. 1990) and social status (Thomas-Hunt et al. 2003).  
We study interpersonal knowledge transfer with a focus on emergent informal structures. A bottom-up approach is 
therefore used and individual heterogeneity and adaptability are assumed. There are two interrelated research 
questions examined in this paper: 
• What informal organizational structures might emerge during interpersonal knowledge transfer? 
• What exogenous factors might affect the above-mentioned emergence process? 
Recent advances in social network analysis (SNA) and agent-based modeling (ABM) have offered appropriate tools 
for exploring these questions. Informal organizational structures are often described as an organizational social 
network
1
 (Kilduff et al. 2003; Krackhardt et al. 1993), which formalizes the social relation between knowledge 
source and recipient (Borgatti et al. 2003a; Szulanski 1996) as well as the entire social context in an organization 
(Brown et al. 2001; Cook et al. 1999; Kogut et al. 1992; Spender 1996). This network evolves over time as 
individual members create and manipulate social structure (Collins 1981) and as interpersonal social relations 
(network ties) form and dissolve (Burt 2000a). Meanwhile its topology provides opportunities for and constraints on 
individual interactions, thus influencing the behavior of individuals within the network (Wellman 1988). We refer to 
this mutual influence as the co-evolution of organizational network and individual behavior in this paper. ABM is a 
research method well-suited for exploring the emergence processes. It includes (a) the simulation of individual 
behaviors and interactions, as well as the environment they exist within, and (b) the analysis of global regularities 
emerging from local interactions (Gilbert 2008). Each agent in the model corresponds to an individual employee in 
the real organization. The model thus enables a realistic representation of individual heterogeneity. A wide range of 
endogenous or exogenous factors and their effects can be examined by setting up and systematically changing model 
parameters.  
This is an exploratory study driven by the agent-based network model we designed. A primary purpose is to show 
how ABM and SNA can help answer research questions that are difficult to handle using traditional methods. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we build the theoretical foundation of our model by reviewing the 
                                                          
1 Individual employees and their social relations are modeled as a set of nodes connected by ties; the overall social context is represented by the 
entire network configuration (Reagans et al. 2003). 
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literature on how social networks shape and are shaped by individual linking behavior. Second, we specify the 
design details of our model, focusing on individual adaptation and network evolution. Third, we present and discuss 
the findings derived from a series of simulation experiments on our model. These experiments intend to explore the 
emergent network structures and the contingencies that influence the emergence process. We conclude the paper 
with a summary of our model and some interesting findings. 
Theoretical foundation of our model 
An agent-based model represents a dynamic adaptive system comprised of autonomous decision-making actors, 
each represented by an individual agent. All agents interact with one another and/or the environment based on a set 
of rules which indicate all legitimate behavioral choices. They are not expected to have the same choice all the time, 
though. Instead, each agent chooses and adapts its behavior independently. Macro regularities or trends emerge from 
the repeated interactions of heterogeneous agents. Our model thus has two main components. One is a fixed number 
of individual agents with a set of predefined linking preferences as their rules of action. The other is a social network 
that enables and constrains agent interactions and indicates macro-level regularities. Both are designed on existing 
theories and/or empirical evidence. 
Individual linking preferences 
In a network setting, an individual’s knowledge-transfer behavior is represented by links to other nodes. Such 
linking behavior exhibits certain individual preferences (Table 1). 
Table 1. Individual linking preferences 
Linking preference Definition Related network statistics 
Exploitation follow strong ties tie strength 
Exploration follow weak ties tie strength 
Acceptance allow for more direct contacts at the same time node degree  
Rejection allow for less direct contacts at the same time node degree 
Heterophily consult with someone who has different knowledge knowledge difference 
Homophily consult with someone who has similar knowledge knowledge difference 
Availability consult with someone less popular  node degree  
Reference consult with someone they share more contacts with the number of common neighbors 
Exploitation or exploration indicates individuals’ preferences for strong or weak ties. Tie strength is defined as a 
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocal services which 
characterize the tie (Granovetter 1973). Weak ties are usually bridges to socially distant regions of a network and 
therefore may result in the transfer of novel knowledge (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973). Strong ties facilitate 
interpersonal knowledge transfer via frequent communication, trustworthiness (Darr et al. 1995; Szulanski et al. 
2004),  and the comprehension of transferred knowledge (Hansen et al. 1999; Szulanski 1996); they help overcome 
obstacles such as time or resource limitation (Hansen et al. 2001; Perlow 1999), psychological burden (Borgatti et 
al. 2003a), competition pressure (Menon et al. 2006; Tsai 2002), and the concern about opportunity costs (Hansen et 
al. 1999) and loss of differentiation (Haas et al. 2005). Acceptance or rejection indicates individuals’ strategies on 
increasing or decreasing contacts. It is formalized as a rise or a decline in the degree of the node that represents the 
individual. Given a fixed number of network members, individual degree variation will influence the density of the 
entire network. Network density is defined as the proportion of possible ties that are actually present in the network. 
A dense network increases homogeneity and promotes mutual identification and trust among individuals, thereby 
easing the externalization of tacit knowledge, lowering the cost of transfer by placing constraints on uncooperative 
behaviors (Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985) and competition threats (Ingram et al. 2000), and improving the 
quality of knowledge (Ahuja 2000; Coleman 1988; 1990; Nonaka 1991; Reagans et al. 2003). In contrast, a sparse 
network with structural holes fails to provide redundant knowledge (Burt 1992; 2004) and the diversity needed to 
improve individual members’ knowledge-transfer capacity (Reagans et al. 2003). Homophily or heterophily indicate 
individuals’ preferences for someone whose knowledge is more similar to or more different from their own. Unlike 
the previous pairs of conflicting preferences, heterophily and homophily are coexistent propensities. While on the 
one hand, knowledge transfer is facilitated by common knowledge (Bower et al. 1981; Nonaka 1991) and shared 
understanding (Weber et al. 2003), on the other hand, knowledge overlap impedes learning (Burgelman 1983) and 
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diversity enables innovation (Amabile 1988). Moderate knowledge difference is thus most useful for learning 
(Schilling et al. 2003). Any individual in reality can only have a limited number of social relations at the same time 
since they are costly to maintain. Too many contacts might undermine an individual’s interaction with each of them 
and thus the success of knowledge transfer, making the individual a less desirable knowledge source (Borgatti et al. 
2003a; Krackhardt 1994). Thus individual agents may choose to link with someone less popular, which we define as 
a linking preference to availability. However, things are different if the potential knowledge source’s contacts are 
acquaintances of the knowledge recipient. The probability that a pair of individuals will be directly connected 
increases with the number of acquaintances they have in common (Newman 2001; Reagans et al. 2003). We call this 
linking preference reference. 
Individual employees are heterogeneous in terms of relation-based knowledge transfer. They serve as knowledge 
sources or recipients (Szulanski 1996) and have different positions in the informal network. Their motivations and 
abilities, influenced by their network positions (Zaheer et al. 2009), are different as well. As for the selection of 
knowledge sources, some prefer new contacts while others stick to acquaintances (Mehra et al. 2001). Moreover, 
individuals keep adapting their strategies. Assume there is a point in time when most individual members in an 
organization prefer internal to external knowledge even though the latter might be better (a linking preference to 
exploitation). This assumption is reasonable since local interactions are often less expensive because of knowledge 
commonality, high commitment, and third-party support. However, exploitation produces isolated subgroups over 
time (Carley 1991) and the excessive similarity in each group results in knowledge redundancy and peer 
competition. Thereby the value of local knowledge transfer is undermined, making distant sources and brokerage 
positions more attractive (Menon et al. 2003). Individuals thus adapt their strategies to build new connections and 
explore novel knowledge (a linking preference to exploration). Since the number of contacts one can hold is limited, 
old strong relations are gradually replaced by new weak ones. Exploration is conducted at a cost of available 
supports to the transfer and incorporation of novel knowledge. This is the time when individuals start to miss 
internal knowledge sources and may go back to them and ask for their help. 
Network structures of individual interactions 
A network perspective on organizational structures has been embraced for several decades (Tichy et al. 1979) and 
there is a proliferation of related research (Borgatti et al. 2003b). Organizational social networks define the 
communication space of individual employees, providing opportunities for and constraints on their interactions 
(Kilduff et al. 2003). 
Previous studies have established that social networks are not randomly established (Barabasi et al. 1999; Watts 
1999) and they are relatively stable over time (Kilduff et al. 2003). Certain structural features are observed 
frequently in real-world social networks. First is the small-world effect — the observation that most network 
members are connected to one another via a short path through the network (Watts 1999), which can be 
mathematically measured using average geodesic distance and local clustering coefficient (Albert et al. 2002; 
Newman 2001). Second is high clustering or transitivity (Holland et al. 1971; Watts et al. 1998) — the observation 
that two individuals are more likely to be connected directly with each other if they have another common neighbor, 
which can be mathematically measured by network density. Finally, many real-world social networks are scale-free 
in that a few network members connect with a large number of other members while most members only have a few 
connections  (Barabasi et al. 1999). Mathematically, the degree distribution of these networks follows a power law. 
Unlike general social networks, organizational social networks are partially closed systems featuring a variety of 
thresholds and limitations: the number of individual members is relatively small; hierarchies are common 
configurations wherein communications across different layers are restricted; resource exchange such as knowledge 
transfer is confined by organization boundaries. However, organizational social networks still exhibit most of the 
structural features of more general ones, such as high local clustering and small-world effect (Skerlavaj et al. 2010). 
The degree distribution of these networks shows that a small number of nodes take possession of most connections 
(Amaral et al. 2000; Newman 2001). 
The network structures of individual interactions with utility maximization purpose has been examined using agent-
based game theoretical models (Dutta et al. 2003; Jackson 2003). In these models, agents interact with one another 
over a network in which each tie indicates benefit and cost. Agents benefit from direct (i.e., attached) and indirect 
ties (indirect benefits decline with increasing distance) but pay for direct ties only. Each agent purposefully adds or 
removes direct ties to maximize their payoffs, which is the difference between their costs and benefits. The network 
structure thereby emerges from and evolves with continuous individual interactions; it is considered stable if no 
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more actors could benefit from manipulating their direct ties. Such a game theoretical model can be examined using 
formal analysis (Jackson et al. 1996), simulation (Bala et al. 2000; Galeotti et al. 2006; Goyal et al. 2007; Hojman et 
al. 2008), or lab experiment (Goeree et al. 2009). No matter what the specific method is, the stable network often 
exhibits a star-like shape.
2
  
Regarding the scale-free network in reality and the star network from modeling, the emergent networks of individual 
interactions tend to have unequal individual positions. This structural inequality is often measured with network 
centralization, which describe the extent that a network is centralized or dominated by a few actors (Freeman 1979). 
So far we have identified three macro regularities about the network structures of individual interactions (Table 2): 
small-world effect, clustering/transitivity, and high centralization. They are stylized facts
3
 (Fagiolo et al. 2007) or 
“statistical signatures” (Gilbert 2008) that can be used to test the validity of our model. Our model also learns from 
various mechanisms that can produce structural inequality. As proposed in the literature, scale-free networks can 
emerge from a process of “preferential attachment” in which the wealthy gets to increase their wealth in a 
sustainable way (Barabasi et al. 1999). Star networks can emerge from unilateral tie formation with benefit decay 
(Bala et al. 2000; Hojman et al. 2008), individual heterogeneity in the costs and benefits of tie formation (Galeotti et 
al. 2006; Goeree et al. 2009), or individual competition for benefits from brokerage positions (Goyal et al. 2007).  
Table 2. Structural features of real-world social networks 
Structural features Description Related statistics 
Small-world effect 
Most network members are connected to one another via a 









Two individuals are more likely to be connected directly 
with each other if they have another common neighbor. 
Network density 
Individual inequality  
A few network members connect with a large number of 




Organizational employees are represented by agents in our model. Each agent has a unique identity, a set of 
attributes indicating its current knowledge level and linking state, and an adaptable set of action strategies on how to 
select knowledge sources. We define a set of linking preferences from which each agent chooses action strategies to 
maximize its payoffs. Informal organizational structure is represented by a social network which shapes and is 
shaped by individual knowledge-transfer interactions. The co-evolution of organizational network and individual 
behavior is modeled as a continuous process of three recurring steps: evaluation, transfer, adaptation. We call a 
complete simulation of the process a run. At the evaluation step, each agent assesses the value of every other agent 
as a source of knowledge. Each of these values helps to calculate the probability that knowledge will be transferred 
between a specific pair of agents. Ties are constructed based on these probabilities and form a network. At the 
transfer step, each agent acquires knowledge from every other agent with which it is tied. We model individual 
knowledge as a vector and the growth of knowledge is represented by increment in the dimensions of the vector. 
The network topology from the last run is updated based on the transfer results. Wherever knowledge transfer 
happens, we add a new tie (if one does not exist) or reinforce the existing one. If a tie exists but no knowledge 
transfer takes place, the tie decays at a given rate. At the adaptation step, individual agents unsatisfied with their 
payoffs in the current run will adapt their action strategies. The pseudo code of simulation is presented in the 
appendix.  
                                                          
2 A star network has a single central actor directly connected with all other (peripheral) actors. 
3 In social sciences, especially economics, a stylized fact is a simplified presentation of an empirical finding. A stylized fact is often a broad 
generalization which is essentially true despite inaccuracies in the detail. 
4 There may be multiple paths between two nodes in a network. Geodesic distance is the length of the shortest path, defined as the number of ties 
which comprise the shortest path.  
5 Local clustering coefficient is the actual number of ties within a node’s neighborhood divided by the maximal possible number of ties within the 
neighborhood. In other words, it is the density of an ego network. 
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Individual payoffs and individual strategy adaptation 
We define individual payoffs as the difference between the value of new knowledge and the costs of knowledge 
transfer. Specifically, the payoff from each knowledge transfer increases with the recipient’s prior knowledge level 
(Cohen et al. 1990), the strength of the tie between source and recipient, and the number of contacts they have in 
common, while decreasing with the degree of the source node. It also has a curvilinear relationship with the 
knowledge difference between source and recipient.  
At each run, every agent follows a specific set of action strategies on selecting knowledge sources, which is a subset 
of the above individual linking preferences. Among these linking preferences, some have continuous effects on 
individual behavior, such as availability and reference, while others take effect in an adaptive way. Individual 
adaptation is implemented by choosing from two pairs of conflicting linking references: exploration/exploitation and 
acceptance/rejection. An agent thus can: (1) follow strong ties (Exploitation) and allow for more degree of its 
representative node (Acceptance), denoted S&M; (2) follow strong ties and allow for less degree (Rejection), 
denoted S&L; (3) follow weak ties (Exploration) and allow for more degree, denoted W&M; (4) follow weak ties 
and allow for less degree, denoted W&L. Each option could be effective depending on the specific cause to 
unsatisfactory payoffs, i.e., whether it is low benefits or high costs or both. Low benefits indicate a lack of 
knowledge diversity in the neighborhood or the agent’s overdependence on strong ties and similar sources. If this is 
the cause, the agent can improve its payoffs by consulting with unfamiliar knowledge sources or expanding the 
search range. In other words, exploration and acceptance are preferable. High costs suggest an inefficient transfer 
process probably caused by the agent’s overuse of weak ties and socially distant sources. To improve the efficiency, 
the agent can either acquire knowledge from people it knows well and trusts or reduce the number of its contacts 
which have taken too much of its time. In other words, exploitation and rejection are preferable. 
We model the evolution of individual behavior as a process of strategy adaptation. To be more realistic, agents are 
assumed to have bounded rationality and thus do not know the exact cause of their unsatisfactory payoffs. That 
means they may not select the most effective strategy combination (from the four options above) the first time but 
improve by trial and error. We allow unsatisfied agents to imitate the strategy combination of their most successful 
and similar contacts, in which success is defined in terms of payoffs while similarity refers to their network 
positions. Admittedly, alternative heuristics exist for choosing new strategies, such as the most commonly used 
strategies among the focal agent’s contacts (Fang et al. 2010). It is even likely that the majority heuristic would do 
better for organizational-level learning in some conditions (Rodan 2008). However, we believe learning from best 
practices while considering their applicability to oneself is more reasonable from an individual perspective. 
Moreover, this heuristic has been used by some influential modeling studies (Lazer et al. 2007). Since the number of 
possible strategy combinations is limited, an agent and all its contacts may converge to have the same strategies in 
which case the focal agent cannot improve any further. As time goes by, it is expected that the most profitable 
strategy combination from the individual perspective would emerge and dominate in the agents. Such a process of 
behavioral evolution is consistent with the framework of evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith 1982). 
The strength of ties and network evolution 
The social network in our model represents the social relations which emerge from and meanwhile affect individual 
interactions for knowledge transfer. The network is comprised of valued, undirected ties. The value of a tie indicates 
its strength. Every tie has the same initial strength which is then updated separately at each run. The network evolves 
over time as the ties form, intensify, and decay.  
Tie strength increases as the amount of knowledge transferred over the tie despite transfer direction, i.e., the payoff 
increment of both agents connected by the tie. Thereby we associate the evolution of organizational social networks 
with repeated interpersonal knowledge transfer. Moreover, the network evolution is not only influenced by the 
frequency, but also by the outcomes of individual interactions: one knowledge-transfer interaction between two 
friends working in the same department is different from two strangers who just meet in a project kick-off meeting. 
Since working relations change very fast, we create a tie without considering the interaction history of source and 
recipient agents. In other words, it doesn’t matter whether there is a tie between them before. As real-world social 
relations decay over time (Burt 2000a), the ties in our model have their strength reduced if no knowledge flows 
through them. They dissolve once the strength becomes zero. The continuous replacement of old ties by new ones 
leads to an evolving social network which is adaptive to the changing environment. The decay rate decreases over 
time as a tie persists (Burt 2000a). The longer a relationship has survived, the more the individuals who are involved 
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get used to it; and the same relationship is more likely to be reused in the future. As evidence, empirical study in 
knowledge transfer has found that people ask acquaintances first to save time and energy (Hansen et al., 2005). 
Previous studies provide few insights on the network-wide evolution of tie strength, which is a complex problem 
regarding individuals’ diverse, even contradictory linking preferences. So far network-wide evolution has been 
mostly examined along with the change of network density (Bae et al. 2008; Cowan et al. 2004; McFadyen et al. 
2009). In our model, these two elements are complementary and interdependent: network density indicates the pool 
of potential sources of new knowledge, with tie strength influencing the agent’s selection of a specific knowledge 
source. Individual agents are designed to choose from four strategy options, each generating a type of ego network.
6
 
As mentioned, we introduce an evolutionary game theory framework in order to explore the most competitive 
strategy and the resultant network 
Simulation results and discussions 
We ran a series of simulations on our agent-based model and analyzed the results using both traditional and new 
statistical tools. All programming and simulations are conducted using Repast Simphony 1.2.0 (Repast Organization 
for Architecture and Design 2010). The analyses are conducted using R 2.10.1 (R Development Core Team 2010).  
Model parameters: contingency theory and sensitivity analysis 
First we examine how the variation of model parameters may influence the emergent network structures. On the one 
hand, it helps us identify potential contingencies, which are critical for experimental design and theory development 
(Davis et al. 2007). On the other hand, a systematic investigation on the relationships between model inputs and 
outputs, also known as sensitivity analysis, will deepen our understanding of the model and facilitate further study. 
Contingency theory argues that there is no one best way of organizing and the optimal organizational structure 
depends on a number of contingencies, such as environmental conditions (Lawrence et al. 1967), organization size 
(Hickson et al. 1969), and knowledge (Birkinshaw et al. 2002). Research on knowledge transfer has distinguished 
the impacts of different types of knowledge (Zander et al. 1995), different characteristics of social relations (Hansen 
et al. 1999; Levin et al. 2004), and different stages of knowledge transfer process (Hansen et al. 2005). Recently in 
an empirical study on network evolution, Faraj and Johnson (forthcoming) observed diversity in the magnitudes of 
same emergent structural features across different online communities, which they attributed to community-specific 
social processes or norms. Sensitivity analysis examines the variation of model outputs or behavior as a result of 
changes in model inputs (e.g., parameter values or initial settings). It intends to explain the relationship between 
inputs and outputs and explore the appropriate range of input parameters. If model outputs or behavior vary little 
with the change of certain inputs, we say the model is robust to those inputs. The opposite situation (i.e., a slight 
input change leads to significant output or behavioral variation) is not necessarily bad. It indicates the discontinuities 
or discrepancies in the model which need further investigation and may result in the development of new theories. 
ABM provides an easy way to explore potential contingencies or conduct sensitivity analysis. It allows us to define 
the contingencies of interests as model parameters and then change their values to create different experimental 
conditions. Changing one parameter at a time is inadequate (Manson 2003) because it omits the interactive effects of 
multiple parameters which are the main reasons for the complexity of agent-based models. Instead, design of 
experiments (DOE) has been proved to be useful for sensitivity analysis on agent-based models (Happe 2005; 
Kleijnen et al. 2005). As a fractional factorial design, DOE selects a limited set of combinations of factor levels to 
simulate, from all of the possible combinations. It thus requires fewer design points and less computing time than 
full factorial design without forgoing much information on the nature of the problem. Since we have 8 potential 
contingency factors (seven model parameters plus the factor of time), a Resolution IV fractional factor design with 
33 scenarios (Box et al. 1978: 410) was applied, in which the values of each factor have low, medium, and high 
three levels. Model parameters and their values are specified in Table 3. The data were collected at t = 500, 1000, 
and 1500. We ran each scenario three times and obtained 105 samples.
7
 A sample contained a given set of parameter 
values (inputs) and the resulting network structures (outputs). Our model was treated as a black box and the input-
                                                          
6 An individual agent’s ego network consists of all its direct contacts and corresponding dyadic ties, and the ties among those contacts. We 
usually call the agent the focal agent and other agents the alters. An ego network represents the focal actor’s immediate social context. 
7 The control scenario, in which every model parameters have its medium-level values, was run nine times. 
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output transformations were approximated by a meta-model. The least-squares linear regression was used to analyze 
the meta-model in which model inputs and outputs serve as independent and dependent variables respectively. 
Table 3. Model parameters and their values in sensitivity analysis 
Parameters Description Range of values 
N Number of individual agents (i.e., network size) 40, 120, 200 
λ  Knowledge obsolescence rate 0.0001, 0.0005, 0.001 
h Dimensions of knowledge 8, 20, 32 
δ  Base cost per knowledge transfer 0.0001, 0.005, 0.01 
ϕ  A parameter reverse to the rate of tie decay 0.001, 0.003, 0.005 
µ  Individuals’ satisfaction threshold of payoffs 0, 0.0005, 0.001 
θ  Rate of changing the number of contacts 1, 4, 8 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression analysis in which the density of emergent networks decreases with the 
network size, the rate of knowledge obsolescence, and the rate of tie decay, while increasing with the dimensions of 
knowledge and the time. Some of these macro-level relationships are consistent with previous findings or logically 
sensible, indicating the validity of the micro-level mechanisms of our model. For example, it has been established 
that many social networks attenuate as they grow larger (Mayhew et al. 1976), and many networks with a fixed 
number of nodes become denser over time (Leskovec et al. 2007). As the result indicates, there tend to be fewer 
knowledge-transfer interactions among individual agents if the knowledge gets obsolescent fast, represented by a 
decline in network density. The number of the dimensions of knowledge (h), on the contrary, is positively related 
with network density, probably because more knowledge dimensions lead to higher extent of knowledge diversity. 
Table 4. Regression model of network density 
 N λ  h ϕ  t 
Estimate  -6.683e-04 -6.839e+01 3.556e-03 3.666e+01 4.708e-05 
p-value < .000*** .002 ** < .000*** < .000*** .009 ** 
R
2
 = 0.6949, Adjusted R
2
 = 0.6796;  F (5, 100) = 45.55, Pr (> F) < .000*** 
Significance-test codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Table 5 presents the fitted regression models of some representative statistics of the emergent network structure 
which we identified above. The average geodesic distance, also called characteristic path length (Watts et al. 1998), 
represents the global reachability in a network. We calculate it without considering tie strength and equalize it to 
network size if the network is unconnected, so this statistic increases with network size (N). In addition, high base 
transfer cost (δ ) tends to enlarge the distance and this effect is stronger when ties decay fast. The result that average 
geodesic distance decreases with the level of knowledge diversity (big h) needs a little more explanation. Potential 
knowledge sources are evaluated on the quantity not the composition of their knowledge. In other words, an agent 
with one piece of knowledge on Dimension A is as valuable as an agent with one piece of knowledge on Dimension 
B. When the number of dimensions (h) is large, there tend to be more agents which are equally valued. So it is more 
likely for an individual agent to connect with a distant source and this new connection will significantly improve the 
closeness in the network. Notably, this mechanism is similar to the one used to create small-world networks (Watts 
et al. 1998). There are other mechanisms that may reduce average geodesic distance, such as adding ties or selecting 
a hub to intermediate all interactions. From Table 5, however, network density (the indicator of the number ties) has 
no linear relation with average geodesic distance. And degree centralization (indicating the existence of a hub), has 
no relation with h. Thus adding ties or creating hubs are not responsible for the reduction of average geodesic 
distance in our model. 
The average local clustering coefficient, also known as the average ego-network density, represents the network’s 
local connectivity. Since an ego network becomes denser as the number of ties between alters (indirect ties for the 
focal agent) increases, this statistic also reflects the extent of indirect connections in the entire network. In our 
model, if most agents allow for more contacts at the same time, the average node degree and the density of the full 
network will rise. Global growth may have local influence, which explains the positive effect of network density on 
average ego-network density in the regression model. The same relationship is observed in an organizational 
learning model (Rodan 2008) completely different from ours, which supports the validity of our model (Axtell et al. 
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1996). Both high base transfer cost (bigδ ) and slow tie decay (bigϕ ) encourage individual agents to stick with 
existing contacts and prevent them from expanding their ego networks; regarding the individual linking preferences 
of exploration and homophily, stable composition tends to create dense ego networks. However, the interaction of 
base transfer cost and tie decay rate shows a significant opposite effect: high transfer cost together with slow tie 
decay tends to attenuate ego networks. This is probably because cluster members rely on existing ties so much that 
their speed of building new ties is even slower than the decay rate. 
Table 5. Regression models of some network statistics 
 Avg geodesic distance Avg clustering coef Avg tie strength Degree Centralization 
Intercept 6.075e+01(.003**) 2.398e-01(<.000***) – 6.446e-02(<.000***) 
N 5.746e-01(<.000***) -5.194e-04 (.010*)   6.895e-03(.012*) -2.767e-04 (<.000***) 
Density – 4.865e-01(.001***) 1.839e+01(<.000***) 1.987e-01(<.000***) 
N × Density – -3.293e-03 (.023*)  – – 
λ  – – – – 
H -1.705e+00 (.001***) – – – 
δ  4.319e+03(.045*) 3.764e+01(<.000***) -1.233e+01 (.01*) – 
ϕ  -8.060e+03(.056 .) 4.670e+01(<.000***) -4.341e+02 (.003**) 6.393e+00(<.000***) 
δ ×ϕ  -1.819e+06 (.003**) -1.105e+04(<.000***) – – 
R
2
  0.5473  0.5598 0.5102  0.7185 
Adjusted R
2
 0.5244 0.5329 0.4908 0.7101 
F statistic 
F (5, 99) = 23.93 
(<.000***) 
F (6, 98) = 20.78 
(<.000***) 
F (4, 101) = 26.3 
(<.000***) 
F (3, 101) = 85.92 
(<.000***) 
The number in each parenthesis is the corresponding p-value. 
The average strength of ties decreases with the rate of tie decay. It is also a positive function of network density, 
indicating that the emergent networks tend to be dense with strong ties or sparse with weak ties. A decline in the 
base transfer cost has two opposite effects on average ties strength. On the one hand, individual agents tend to build 
more ties which are too new to be strong and pull down the average strength level. On the other hand, tie strength 
grows faster per transfer; it equals to the knowledge recipient’s payoffs which increase as transfer costs go down. 
The regression model reveals the second effect by controlling density which indicates the first effect.  
The macro regularities of network structures are emergent and need to be accumulated. A sparse network, in which 
the nodes are equally poorly connected, does not have sufficient ties to bring forth these regularities. Degree 
centralization indicates one of the usually observed regularities in a social network; that is, the rich tend to get 
richer. So degree centralization is expected to increase with network density. Likewise, a low rate of tie decay 
promotes the emergence of macro-level regularities, advancing the extent of centralization in the network. Both are 
supported by the results of regression. Since degree centralization represents the variation of ego-network density 
given a fixed network size (Marwell et al. 1988), the regression results of average ego network density and degree 
centralization together suggest that the entire network gets denser when tie decay is slower, but the rate varies in 
different local areas. 
Our model shows a high level of validity in that it is able to generate structural features of real organizational social 
networks. Now we will use the model to examine the average knowledge level in the system, especially how it 
varies with model parameters. From Table 6, it declines over time since there is no reproduction of knowledge or 
any other kinds of innovation in our model and the total amount of knowledge continuously goes down because of 
obsolescence. The average knowledge level decreases with the rate of knowledge obsolescence ( λ ). An increase in 
the base transfer cost (δ ) reduces the average level of knowledge by discouraging knowledge transfer. As designed, 
every time only one dimension of knowledge is transferred, so the more dimensions there are, the larger proportion 
of knowledge is out of date before getting transferred. This means a negative relationship between the dimensions of 
knowledge (h) and the average knowledge level. The obsolescence rate and base transfer cost have an interaction 
effect in that the former gets stronger while the latter gets weaker and vice versa. Time interacts with all other 
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factors. As knowledge diversity in the system shrinks over time, interpersonal knowledge transfer becomes less 
frequent, making base transfer cost and dimensions of knowledge less influential. Without compensations from 
other agents, the effect of knowledge obsolescence rate gets stronger. 
Table 6. Regression model of average knowledge level 
 Intercept λ  h δ  t λ ×δ  λ × t h × t δ × t 
















p-value  .000***  .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .000*** .02* .000*** 
R
2
 = 0.9775, Adjusted R
2
 = 0.9756;  F (8, 96) = 521.5, Pr (> F) < .000*** 
Figure 1 shows how different value combinations of the three independent variables— λ , h, andδ — influence the 
evolution of average knowledge level. We distinguish seven types of evolution. In general, the average knowledge 
level first increases and then decreases (except for a few Type IV instances). Type I evolution is featured by fewer 
knowledge dimensions, slow knowledge obsolescence and low base transfer cost. Thus Type I evolution achieves 
the highest average knowledge level in a short time and is able to stay high for a long time.  Type II evolution, 
however, has a much steeper decreasing trend caused by a high obsolescence rate, even though the values of h and 
δ are the same as Type I. The average knowledge level of Type III evolution rises slowly because of high transfer 
cost, but it decreases slowly too for the same reason as Type I. Type IV evolution has a relatively flat trend. It seems 
whatever impact on one knowledge dimension (by taking the average) is attenuated when there are many 
dimensions. Type V evolution performs the control scenario. Its evolutionary trend assimilates Type IV at the 
beginning but then goes down. In Type VI evolution, high obsolescence rate produces a steep decreasing trend, and 
high transfer cost prohibits the aggregation of knowledge. Type VII evolution shows no sign of growth in the 
average amount of individual knowledge, probably because transferring one dimension of knowledge each time is 
too slow in the face of diverse knowledge which gets outdated quickly. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of average knowledge level  
Designed to be independent, the parameters of our model show difference in the type and the extent of their effects. 
The parameters that affect the responsiveness of individual actions, such as the satisfaction threshold of payoffs ( µ ) 
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and the rate of increasing/decreasing contacts (θ ), do not have apparent influence on model outputs. In contrast, 
those affecting the rate of environmental change, such as knowledge obsolescence rate and tie decay rate, are 
significant. Sometimes the influences of model parameters are from the network level; that is, through network size 
and density. For example, knowledge diversity (h) has no significant effect on degree centralization once network 
size and density are controlled. However, sometimes they show more effects than that can be globally explained. For 
example, the impact of h on average geodesic distance also comes from the range of individual choices. It would be 
useful to look into the emergence process driven by individual agents. Simulations can help us with this but first we 
need to decide what specific parameter values to use in the simulation. The sensitivity analysis above provides some 
scenarios from which we select simulation conditions. One scenario will be chosen for each type of knowledge 
change except for Type V (Figure 1), and we expect the resultant simulated network to exhibit the small-world 
effect. For each scenario, we built a random network with the same size and density as the corresponding simulated 
network, and compared the average geodesic distance and the average local clustering coefficient of both networks. 
Random networks often serve as benchmarks in the small-world literature (Watts 1999; Watts et al. 1998). Their 
average geodesic distance is the lower bound of that of small-world networks, and they are supposed to have smaller 
average local clustering coefficients than small-world networks. Accordingly, we picked six scenarios, as marked by 
dash lines in Figure 2. Their simulation results are reported in next section. 
 
Figure 2: Small-world effects in simulated and random networks under different scenario conditions 
Network evolution and the emergence process 
Figure 3 presents the parameter values and the emergent networks of six simulations, each corresponding to a 
scenario mentioned above. We extended the ending time (t) of Scenario 26 and 15 until the strategies of individual 
agents converge and the average knowledge level begins to decline. We also reduced the ending times of Scenarios 
5, 21, and 25 to capture the emergent structures before they are destroyed by tie decay. The size of nodes indicates 
the amount of individual knowledge. The width of ties indicates the strength of social relations. Different colors 
indicate different types of individual strategies. Each simulation was started with an empty network for simplicity. 
Potential bias of the initial state can be omitted because each simulation has converged (Kelton 1997). The final 
strategy of individual agents is following strong ties and allowing for more nodal degree (S&M) in Simulation A, 
following weak ties and allowing for more degree (W&M) in Simulation B to E, following weak ties and allowing 
for less degree (W&L) in Simulation F. 
We examined the micro-level factors to the emergent macro-level structures with exponential random graph (ERG) 
modeling (Handcock et al. 2003; Wasserman et al. 1996). An ERG model is essentially a logistic regression model 
of multiple predictor variables; the dependant variable stands for the presence or absence of a tie. Each predictor 
represents the resultant configuration of a micro behavior, such as the triangle formed by the reference linking 
preference, or a covariate measured at a certain level of analysis, such as the knowledge level of individual agents. 
The model tests whether the structural consequences of these predictors appear in a network by chance. Like other 
logistic regression procedures, coefficients are estimated to minimize the -2 Log Likelihood statistics so that the 
most probable network is the observed one. Coefficients indicate the extent that corresponding predictors contribute 
to generating the observed network; p-value indicates the level of significance. Using ERM models, we are able to 
identify what micro-level factors are responsible for the emergent macro structures. The micro-level factors to be 
examined include the individual linking preferences in Table 1 and two individual-level measures — individual 
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agents’ knowledge level and revenues. The corresponding predictors and the ERG models of six simulated networks 
are shown in Table 7. We used the number of isolates
8
 as a control variable because isolates are the majority in the 
emergent networks of some simulations (see Figure 3). The analysis results were obtained using the R package 
statnet (Handcock et al. 2003). 
 N λ  h δ  ϕ  ∆  µ  t 
Simulation A (Scenario 33) 40 0.0001 8 0.0001 0.005 1 0 500 
Simulation B (Scenario 5) 40 0.001 8 0.0001 0.005 8 0.001 1,000 
Simulation C (Scenario 26) 40 0.0001 8 0.01 0.001 1 0.001 800 
Simulation D (Scenario 21) 40 0.0001 32 0.01 0.001 8 0.001 1,000 
Simulation E (Scenario 25) 40 0.001 8 0.01 0.001 8 0 1,000 
Simulation F (Scenario 15) 200 0.001 32 0.01 0.001 8 0.001 700 
 
Figure 3: Model parameters and emergent networks of six simulations 
Given p <=.001, the number of individual agents’ contacts, which depends on individual agents’ preferences for 
more or fewer contacts, significantly predicts the emergent structures in all six simulations. The more heavily an 
individual is connected in the past, the more contacts it tends to possess at present. This is consistent with the 
universal observation of uneven degree in real-world social networks. Another all-significant factor is individual 
linking preference of availability, represented by the predictor of weighted degree distribution. Both factors are 
positively related with the total number of ties in a network. However, availability contains an additional tendency; 
that is, the log-odds of adding one more tie decreases with the degree of the nodes involved (Hunter 2007). The fact 
that availability is still significant after accounting for the effect of node degree is insightful. It means the probability 
that the entire network adds an additional tie actually decreases with the degree of the nodes involved. In other 
words, a new tie is more likely to be added between a pair of less connected agents. This is a tendency  away from 
preferential attachment (Barabasi et al. 1999), a widely accepted explanation for the scale-free degree distribution of 
real-world networks given by the physics community. Faraj et al. (forthcoming) observed the same anti-tendency 
empirically but did not give a reason. Our results lead to an explanation, in the context of knowledge transfer, that 
the rich remain to be rich not by attracting more new contacts, but by better maintaining their existing contacts than 
others. We have three exhibits supporting this explanation based on our modeling. First of all, if this explanation is 
correct, then the superiority of  heavily connected agents should be especially acute when the environment is 
unfavorable for keeping ties, such as Simulation E and F in which tie decay rate, knowledge obsolescence rate, and 
base transfer cost are all relatively high. As expected, the coefficient of the item node degree in either Simulation E 
or F is larger than that in other scenarios, implying its greater influence in these two scenarios. In addition, our 
model’s differentiation of existing ties and new ties by their strength also provide a way to test our explanation in a 
dynamic and evolutionary context. If the rich keep their popularity by building new ties, then the average strength of 
their attached ties would be relatively low; that is, a negative correlation between an individual’s average tie strength 
                                                          
8 An isolate is a network node without any neighbors. 
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and the probability that it gets a new tie. Otherwise, there should be a positive correlation. This might be difficult to 
observe since individual linking strategies are adaptive. Chances are that individual behavior causes structural 
changes overshadowing the phenomenon we intend to see. Assume a popular agent who does not want to be popular 
any longer and starts to limit the number of its connections. It takes time for the new strategy to be effective while at 
the same time the agent’s current popularity still contributes to attracting new contacts or maintaining old contacts. 
However, we were able to find some evidence by comparing different simulations of our model. When the dominant 
individual strategy (see Figure 3) favors strong ties, such as that in Simulation A, the abovementioned positive 
correlation will be amplified. In contrast, when the dominant individual strategy favors weak ties, such as that in any 
simulation other than A, the abovementioned positive correlation will be less influential or even unobservable. This 
is exactly the case shown in our analysis results. From Table 7, the effect of an individual’s average tie strength is 
significant in Simulation A with a coefficient as high as 152.51, while the same effect is much weaker in Simulation 
E (7.09) and F (8.69) and unobservable in all other simulations. Finally, According to our explanation, the extra 
tendency of availability affects new established ties rather than old existing ones. The analysis results in Table 4 tell 
us that small λ and big h help to increase network density by promoting the formation of new ties, while big ϕ  (low 
decay rate) and big t help by maintaining old ties. Simulation D has the best combination of small λ and big h, while 
Simulation B has the best combination of big ϕ  and big t. So if our explanation is correct, the impact of availability, 
represented by corresponding coefficient, should be the largest in Simulation D and the smallest in Simulation B, 
which is exactly the case as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7. ERG models for six simulations 
Micro-level 
factors 
Predictors Sim A Sim B Sim C Sim D Sim E Sim F 
Exploration 
Exploitation 
Average strength of 
ties attached to a node 
152.52*** – – – 7.09*** 8.69** 
Acceptance 
Rejection 




between two nodes 










0.47*** 0.56*** – 0.31*** 0.68*** 0.19** 
Individual 
knowledge 
Value of a node’s 
knowledge attribute 
-0.46*** -0.95*** -0.67*** -1.13*** -2.14*** -2.59*** 
Individual 
revenue 








Significance-test codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Another interesting result is that individual agents who have more knowledge tend not to connect with others, as 
indicated by the significant negative effect of individual knowledge in all six simulations. In our model the most 
connected agents are not the most knowledgeable ones regardless the scenarios. The simulations able to produce 
more aggregate knowledge seem to be less influenced by this negative correlation. In Figure 1, the sequence of 
simulations in terms of average knowledge level is Simulation A (Type I) > C (III) > B (II) > D (IV) > E (VI) > F 
(VII). In Table 7, the sequence of simulations in terms of the coefficient of the item individual knowledge is 
Simulation A (-0.46) > C (-0.67) > B (-0.95) > D (-1.13) > E (-2.14) > F (-2.59). Since we do not directly model the 
aggregate knowledge level, this consistency validates the negative correlation between individual connectivity and 
individual expertise. This negative correlation is not rare in knowledge management practice (Davenport et al. 
                                                          
9 This statistic equals to the weighted distribution of the number of shared neighbors of two nodes, which often substitutes for the number of 
triangles in the network to prevent the ERG model producing degenerating results (Hunter 2007). 
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1998). Our model and simulations provide abundant details for us to look into the formation and evolution of this 
problem, although the discussions here may not be generalized beyond this model. First we need to figure out the 
actual meaning of the negative correlation. There could be two interpretations regarding the co-evolution of network 
structure and individual behavior. One is that heavily connected agents tend to become less knowledgeable over 
time; the other is that knowledgeable agents tend to stay outside interpersonal interactions for knowledge transfer. 
The interpretations have completely different implications on management. The former suggests maintaining a 
moderate extent of network connectivity, while the latter suggests engaging employees in the network as much as 
possible. Given p <=.1, the knowledge difference between a pair of agents has no significant impact on the 
probability of their connecting in all six simulations. Since we do integrate mechanisms based on knowledge 
difference, such as homophily and heterophily, into individual action rules, it must be that their macro-level effects 
on network structures conflict and offset each other. In other words, the emergence processes we simulated are not 
significantly influenced by the knowledge distribution among individual agents. That means network structures 
affect individual knowledge difference but not vice versa in our model. Previous analysis also supports the former 
interpretation by explaining why popular agents fail to remain knowledgeable if they have ever been. As mentioned, 
individual agents who are heavily connected tend to maintain existing ties rather than attract new ones. The 
composition of their knowledge sources is consequently stable, reducing their chance of acquiring knowledge from 
potential sources in a distance.
10
 In addition, the individual linking preference of reference has significantly positive 
effects in Table 7, which is a sign of clustering or transitivity (Holland et al. 1971; Watts et al. 1998); that is, two 
disconnected agents tend to connect if they have shared contacts. Clustering leads to knowledge redundancy in 
individual agents’ ego networks, the extent to which may become so high as to constrain individual revenues (Burt 
2000b). Actually this is exactly what happens in our model. In the simulations where clustering exists, individual 
connectivity tends to have a negative correlation with individual revenue, such as in Simulation A, B, D, and E, or 
no correlation at all, such as in Simulation F. Simulation C is the only one in which there is no significant sign of 
clustering, probably because the dominant individual strategy asks for weak ties and less degree. Accordingly, it is 
the only scenario in which individuals’ revenues are positively related with their connectivity. 
Conclusion 
IWe explore two related issues of interpersonal knowledge transfer within organizations: (a) informal organizational 
structure that emerges from individual interactions for utility maximization, and (b) exogenous factors that affect the 
emergence processes. Agent-based modeling (ABM) is employed to support a bottom-up approach allowing for 
individual adaptability and heterogeneity. We conducted a series of simulation experiments on our model and 
obtained some interesting results. The informal organizational structure is represented by a social network whose 
evolution shows the following features: 
• The degree distribution of the network is unequal in that well connected agents remain well connected over time 
While a previous study (Barabasi et al. 1999) suggested it was because well connected agents are better at 
attracting new contact, our model provides a different explanation that they are better at maintaining old contacts. 
• Knowledgeable individuals are not well connected in the network. In other words, they are insufficiently engaged 
in knowledge transfer. While the reason might be knowledgeable individuals are reluctant to participate, our 
model suggests another probability that overly involvement in social connections distract individuals from 
acquiring knowledge, thus undermining individuals’ knowledge advantage over time. 
In addition, we did regression analysis on model inputs and outputs and the results indicate separate and joint effects 
of some exogenous factors: 
• If an organization has high knowledge diversity, the formed informal network shows good reachability; that is, 
any two individuals are connected via a few intermediates. 
• When the knowledge is highly diverse or becomes obsolete fast, interpersonal relation-based knowledge transfer 
is less effective in terms of improving average knowledge level. 
Our work provides new insight on research methodology. It demonstrates that ABM is a good tool for theory 
exploration, and it shows that ABM is well-suited to answer question regarding how decentralized local interactions 
generate macro-level regularities (Epstein 1999). Our agent-based model consists of individual agents who act 
                                                          
10 By distance, we mean the source and the recipient might belong to different clusters which are separated by “structural holes” (Burt 1992), or 
connected through weak ties (Granovetter 1973). 
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independently but follow general action rules. These agents increase their payoffs by interacting with and acquiring 
knowledge from one another. Each agent continuously adapts its strategies on source selection to maximize its own 
payoffs. All agents are linked in a social network. Their knowledge-transfer interactions shape this network by 
adding new ties or making existing ties stronger. Meanwhile, the network structures influence individual knowledge 
transfer behavior through their payoffs. We also define a set of model parameters which represent potential 
exogenous factors. The model has limitations as well. First, the exogenous factors are predefined as embedded 
model parameter, while in reality they can appear or disappear at any time during network evolution. Second, we 
assume the initial network is empty and social relations are established only through the interactions of knowledge 
transfer; however, social networks can be built for other reasons and then utilized for knowledge transfer. Finally, 
our model does not consider the growth of organizational knowledge. No new knowledge is created and recipients 
gain knowledge by acquiring existing knowledge from new sources. The simulated system is closed with a fixed 
number of agents, so there is no new knowledge obtained by recruiting new members either. 
Appendix  
BEGIN 
Get the maintained network SNet; Initiate a new network KNet; 
Procedure agent.evaluation () { 
     WHILE (true)  
IF (the system’s updateDone == false) THEN Wait; 
 ELSE  
  FOR (each of the other agents in the system, j) 
   Compute the value of j as i’s knowledge source, V(i,j);  
Compute the probability of i and j being connected, P(i,j);  
IF (P(i,j) >= a random number in [0,1]) THEN Connect i and j in KNet; 
ENDIF 
  ENDFOR 
  i’s connectionDone = true;  
 ENDIF 
     ENDWHILE 
} 
Procedure agent.transfer & agent.adaptation () { 
     WHILE (true) { 
 IF (any other agent’s connectionDone == false) THEN Wait; 
 ELSE  
  FOR (each of agent i’s current contacts in KNet, j) 
Update i’s knowledge K(i) based on G(i,j); 
Compute i’s revenue from its interaction with j, R(i,j); 
Add to i’s total revenue in the current time run, TR(i); 
  ENDFOR 
  IF (TR(i) < i’s satisfactionThresh) THEN 
   FOR (each of agent i’s current contacts in SNet, k) 
IF (SE(i,k)==0 OR TR(k)/SE(i,k) is the biggest of all) THEN 
Assign k’s strategies to i; Get out of the FOR loop; 
ENDIF 
   ENDFOR 
  ENDIF 
  i’s interactionDone = true; 
 ENDIF 
     ENDWHILE 
} 
Procedure system.update () { 
     WHILE (true)  
IF (any other agent’s interactionDone == false) THEN Wait; 
 ELSE  
  FOR (each tie in SNet, (i,j)) 
Update S(i,j) based on R(i,j) and the decay function W(i,j); 
IF (S(i,j)==0) THEN Delete (i,j) from SNet; ENDIF 
  ENDFOR 
  FOR (each agent in the system, i) 
   Reduce K(i) based on the knowledge obsolescence rate; 
  ENDFOR 
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